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AFRICAN UNION MECHANISMS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS
ABSTRACT
Africa is plagued by conflicts, most of which are intra-state in nature. Thus, the regional organisation – the AU had its hands full of crises requiring resolution. The AU as an organization came into being in 2004, having transformed from the OAU. These conflicts which have occurred mostly in sub-Saharan Africa have been protracted; thus calling to question the effectiveness of the AU mechanisms for crisis management. This study was therefore set out with the purpose of examining the AU mechanisms for crisis management. It specifically identified the challenges confronting the AU mechanisms for crisis management in Africa and suggested prospects in enhancing the mechanisms for managing crisis. A combination of questionnaires and unstructured interviews of relevant personalities in the area of the research were conducted and administered. These interviews, coupled with studies of other relevant literature in the field of study revealed that there were obvious signs of determination by the AU to improve its capability in crisis management. This is evident in the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC which serves as the main mechanism for crisis management. The PSC is assisted by the NEPAD initiative, ASF, Panel of the Wise and CEWS in this vein. It was established in the study that the AU mechanisms was however still hampered by the lack of political will, lack of logistics, financial sustainability and external influence. Other challenges are mistrust among African leaders and lack of well trained and motivated national militaries in some African States. The study recommended that, for an effective mechanism for crisis management to work, the AU should increase the budget for the PSC as well as further levying of member states in order to make up for deficiency in funding crisis management. It was also recommended that the AU develops a political will in managing crisis in the African continent.
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
- BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Fifty years ago, after the demise of colonialism, Africa was expected to grow faster than Asia. Much hope was pinned on the continent as a result of the inherent potentials. Expectations were rife that the dawn of the 21st century would usher Africa into its age of growth, progress, and new lease on life for its people along with the rest of the world; in consequent to the age of tremendous progress in every facet of human life, as evident in technological advancements, the volume of international trade and commerce, global travel and communications, increased opportunities for vast populations in the world as ushered by the end of the Cold War (Olowu, 2004:1). In recognition of this, African leaders met to kick-start the developmental cause and formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The African super-national organisation later metamorphosed to African Union (AU) in July 2002 following the adoption of 53 African leaders (i.e. all African nations except Morocco) on the ground that the former had been marked by a largely unsatisfactory record. The newly formed AU was modelled after the European archetype (Klingebiel, 2005:2), the European Union, with a more promising prospect of transforming Africa to a more developed continent that can rival with other developed continent most especially the arch rival Asia that is developing day in-day out.
Yet, over the past decades, we have witnessed economic growth and increasing wealth across Asia to the extent that countries such as Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Singapore, and Malaysia transformed in a jiffy. Thus, pave way to the birth of a new epithet “Asian Tigers”, while much of Sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from relative economic stagnation and poor development characterised by our diversity and historical trajectories. The questions thus arise: When should we expect to hear the emergence of our own epithetical adjective of African Lions? Why does economic development not translate into human development and reduction of poverty? Is the current African growth- as espouse in this paper- sustainable? These among others are the fundamental questions needed to be answered. Despite the endowed rich diverse renewable and non-renewable natural resources, Africans remain ‘poor’. This led to the unmistakable consensus among scholars, intergovernmental organizations and international institutions that Africa had become a matter of emergency that demanded urgent attention, if the Afro-pessimists’ argument that ‘Africa cannot claim its place in the 21st century’ should be discountenance. According to Glantz (1991), pinning the obstacle to African development to one factor would probably be erroneous but the problems hindering the continent’s developmental efforts can be categorised under: Coups, Corruption, Conflict and Climate. On a general note, Africa’s underdevelopment is said to be a product of the interplay of external and domestic factors including slavery and colonialism, economic mismanagement, illconceived structural adjustment policies, inter-state and intra-state conflicts, failed regionalism, unfair trade terms, foreign debt, aid dependence, poor governance, weak states, and institutional decay (Mills and Jean-Pierre, 2011: 97). Thomson (2000:7) earlier argued that the external and domestic factors are also consequence of the legacies of history impacting on the present. He argued that there are lines of continuity that run from the pre-colonial period, through the colonial era, right into the modern age. Be it as it may, the developmental challenges facing the continent include but not limited to: Possible spread of Arab Spring uprisings to Sub-Sahara Africa, diversification and integration into the global economy, income inequalities, hunger and poverty, restricted movement of people, goods and services, troika of African institutions, contingency plan for malaise in the West (Akukwe, 2012), systemic corruption, dearth of infrastructural facilities, leadership and followership problems, increasingly complex neoliberal globalization, changes in intercultural relations at the global level, the ICTs revolution, the evolution of gender and intergenerational relations, the evolution of spirituality and of the status and the role of religion in modern societies, the emergence of a multi-polar world and the phenomenon of emerging Asian powers and the issue of competing regionalism.
One of the most daunting problems hindering the effort of African Union in integrating the continent towards developmental transformation in line with its motto: “a United and Strong Africa” (see AU website: http://www.ea.au.int) is the issue of ethnic divisions which was caused chiefly by Slavery. Nunn (2007:1) attested to this fact when he asserted that ‘the largest numbers of slaves were taken from areas that were the most underdeveloped politically at the end of the 19th century and are the most ethnically fragmented today’. The emergence of colonialism added salt to injury through the imposition of arbitrary boundaries on Africa by colonial powers at the Berlin Conference of 1885 where Africa was partitioned with complete disregard for existing societal and geographic boundaries. Consequently, this disadvantaged many countries by disrupting established indigenous communication and trade linkages, creating an abnormally large number of landlocked states, and leaving various countries (such as Niger) without natural resources (Sachs, 2005). Throughout the colonial era, Africa witnessed nothing but political subjugation, economic distortion and human and natural resources exploitation, cultural suppression, ideological domination, and technological stagnation; which led to the underdevelopment of the continent.
During the decolonisation period, the colonialists handed over power to their cronies who ruled in their (European powers’) interest to ensure Africa remain a dumping ground for their finished goods and source of raw materials and cheap labour. It is arguable that the consciousness of some leaders such as Kwame Nkurumah, Julius Nyerere among others to deviate from the laid down path of the colonial powers through the pursuit of Afrocentric development strategies also undermine African development (an argument which I personally do not subscribe to). Luiz (2006) opined that the pursuit by most post-independence African ruling elites of Afrocentric development strategies, based on Marxist principles and rejection of Western capitalism, was very costly. He argued that Africa turned inward and isolationist at a time when much of the world embraced open and outward-oriented economic policies, which eventually led to some dubious policy decisions that, together with a lack of institutional capabilities, undermined growth and created an unattractive business environment. Luiz’s argument was corroborated by earlier observation that Ghana and South Korea had an almost equal per capita income of US$490 and US$491 respectively in 1957. However, by 1980, Ghana’s per capita income had fallen to US$400 while South Korea’s had increased to over US$2000 (Werlin, 1994).
On a contrary argument, the underdevelopment of the continent came about as a result of Africa’s experience of the establishment of a whole range of regional schemes for political and economic cooperation by the colonialists. This wave of regionalisation occurred for several reasons, some practical, others ideological (Benedikt, 2007:2). Notably, the independence and the concomitant break-up of the colonial federations such as the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), the Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF), and the Central African Federation had suddenly highlighted the negative consequences of the extreme segmentation and the intrinsically problematic viability of the political divisions and economic circuits inherited from the colonial period (Bach, 1999:3).
Without the binding structures of the colonial administrations, Africa’s newly independent states were quickly confronted by economic and political disunity as the colonial powers had concentrated on forging vertical links between their metropoles and their dependent colonies rather than horizontal links (Adedeji, 1984: 231).
The outcome of the misguided economic policies implemented by post-colonial African governments was that African countries were left without a sound industrial base and necessary capital, with an insignificant share of the world market, a heavy dependency on the developed countries, and mounting foreign debts (Ayittey, 2005). Furthermore, numerous decades after African countries gained independence, the terms of their economies’ incorporation into the global economy remained largely unchanged: they continued to be locked into the role of traditional commodity exporter and importer of capital goods and technologies, with most economies undiversified and their commodity exports concentrated in a narrow range of products (Mills and Jean-Pierre, 2011: 97). In fact, they had not only consistently discouraged the former colonies (unless it served an imperial purpose), but also amplified the resultant difficulties through what Nkrumah called “by far the greatest wrong which the departing colonialists had ever inflicted on Africa, namely, to leave us divided into economically unviable states which bear no possibility of real development” (Nkurumah, 1973: 282-4). This was simply expressed by the following wordings in Arusha Declaration in the analysis of the truths of the colonial experience in Africa: “We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal” (cited in Rodney, 1972: 227)
It is worthy to note that this exploitation still continues till date under the context of neo-colonialism. The desire to mitigate this wrong, to combat the ongoing exploitation of the continent’s resources and to achieve some sort of economic and political viability was one of the main motivations for the African states to begin regional cooperation. This necessitated the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. However, it should be noted that not all governments (and resistant movements) of the continent subscribed to the underlying idea of African oneness. It is premised on this that it is hardly surprising that Africa’s decolonisation was accompanied by a proliferation of intergovernmental organisations, federations, unions, and communities some of which were virtually moribund from the beginning while others quickly gained membership and political influence (Benedikt, 2007:2) which subsequently bring about the problem of conflicting and competing regionalism in Africa thereby undermining the continent’s integration. This led to the uneasy relationship between the African Union (AU) and the continent’s sub-regional organisations, as well as the ongoing rivalry between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its various francophone shadows such as the Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) or the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA).
Under the disguise of lending helping hands to a continent grasping from the claw of underdevelopment, ravaged by disintegration and proliferation of regional organisations, a continent lacking private fund to finance infrastructural development, in which the little available are being mismanaged and diverted to Swiss foreign bank account; the international community decided to adopt Aid and Cooperation as a game of keeping Africa under perpetual underdevelopment. The Western powers deliberately introduced Aid, Loan and Cooperation during the decolonisation period as a game of influence played by the powerful States with an asymmetrical relationship. Hugon (2010: 109-10) opined that these Donors provide official development assistance (ODA) for varying reasons: solidarity (struggle against poverty, urgent aid), utilitarianism (access to natural resources, presence in protected markets), geostrategic interests (security, conflict prevention, fight against terrorism, management of migratory or epidemiological risks, seeking a voice in international decisions), cultural expansion (defence of language and culture), bad conscience (post-colonial guilt, the white man’s burden) or even developmentalism (reduction of international asymmetry and divergence of trajectories).
Be it as it may, extant studies have proven that Aid-giving and Loans to the continent under whatever reason and event is compounding the continent’s predicament which consequently led to the fiscal trap, a consequence of debt overhang, which made important stimulatory expenditure on health care, roads, power grids and ports no longer possible (Sachs, 2005; Mills and Jean-Pierre, 2011; Hugon, 2010; Mbeki, 2009). Much of these Aid and Loans were more often than not diverted, misappropriated and embezzled by African leaders which led Africa to the continent of debt-ridden nations. The Aid game enables the international communities and financial institutions notably World Bank and IMF to determine how African economy is being run through the introduction of several economic reforms aimed at subjugating the continent economically. These includes: currency devaluation, Structural Adjustment Programmes, among others which after their introduction and implementation more often than not left African economy worse-off. For instance, the resultant effect of the failed structural adjustment policies foisted on the debt-ridden African nations by the international financial institutions, are evident in the adverse economic and social consequences, including falling economic output, balance of payments difficulties, as well as rising poverty, foreign debts, falling world prices of primary export products, inequality and unemployment which contributed immensely to Africa’s underdevelopment (Guest, 2004; Stiglitz, 2007; Mbeki, 2009; Moyo, 2009; Chabal, 2002).
The history of Africa has been replete with conflicts. Conflicts have ripped through the continent such that in Africa today, crisis in human security has emerged. The resultant effects are increasing internal conflicts, frustrated aspirations and rising social tensions. Other effects are the displacement of people from their societies, value systems as well as loss of governments and institutions. The need to rid the continent from the scourge of conflicts and crises necessitated the birth of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 (Obasanjo, 2005).
The initial OAU mechanism for crisis management in Africa was the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), which came into effect in 1964. However, the post Cold War era brought about a new political stability and social economic development. Thus, the OAU attempted to change its mechanism for crisis management by adopting the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in 1993 (Lemarchand). This mechanism was found to be deficient in some areas especially, the power to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. This was amongst the reasons for the transformation of the Organization into the African Union (AU) in 2004 (Imobighe, 2003:67). Today, Africa is plagued by conflicts most of which are intra state in nature. Thus, the regional organisation, AU has its hands full of crises requiring resolution. These conflicts and crises which occurred mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa have been protracted, thus posing serious challenges to the AU.
The drift by some African States into unmitigated chaos became a constant source of worry to many leaders in the continent and the international community at large. The series of conferences and summits held across the continent reflected this. It was at an Ordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 2001 that the Constitutive Act of AU was adopted by 53 member states of the OAU in Lome, Togo (Salim, 2002:18). Furthermore, the desire for a stronger organisation that would be capable of handling the numerous conflicts that plagued the continent provided the initiative that paved the way for the birth of the AU. This process began in Sirte, Libya in September 1999 during an extraordinary summit of the OAU (Salim, 2002:23).
The AU, thus aimed at achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and its people, defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states. It was also to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; and promote peace, security and stability on the continent (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).
The Constitutive Act of the Union was then to enter into force 30 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU. Consequently, the Act entered into force on 26 May 2000 after Nigeria deposited its instrument of ratification with the OAU Secretariat on 26 April 2000; being the thirty-sixth member state to do so (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).
At its inception, the AU in a bid to realise collective security in the continent set out certain principles to guide the union. The principles and values informing the African Collective Security Policy include, inter-alia, the principles contained in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.
The indivisibility of the security of African States is made such that the security of one African country is inseparably linked to the security of other African countries, and the African continent as a whole. Accordingly, any threat or aggression on one African country is deemed to be a threat or aggression on the others and the continent as a whole. These threats are then brought to the immediate attention of the Assembly of the Union or the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for decision and action as appropriate, in conformity with the AU principles and objectives (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).
Conscious of the inadequacy of the clause of non-interference in the affairs of member states, a new clause in the Constitutive Act of the AU expressed the right of the Union to intervene. This is in pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The clause resulted from experiences gained in previous conflict management attempts in the continent under the OAU.
The AU has been involved in the management of the Sudanese, Ethiopia-Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) crises among others in Africa. However, with the eventual transformation of the OAU into AU, crises management and peace support operations remain a process. This in the opinion of many still requires extra efforts on the part of the organisation. Salim Ahmed Salim, a former Secretary General of OAU succinctly made the point when he declared:
…with the creation of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management in Cairo in 1993, a view and significantly different vision emerged in one continent. The creation of that mechanism signified a change from the position of “don’t interfere” to one “collective concern” for the peace, security and stability of the people of our continent. The doctrine became what happens to my neighbour is my responsibility also”. Since then, the issue of internal conflicts has become a matter of continental concern (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).
The management of conflicts and crises by Africans has thus presented an opportunity on the emergence of the AU. Though the AU is still new, the expectations of Africans in the ability of the organisation to manage conflicts and crises, is indeed very high. It remains to be seen if this optimism can be translated into effective conflict and crises management which would lead to successful conflict resolution.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The African continent has been synonymous with conflicts even before the formation of the OAU and now AU. This situation cannot be divorced from historical factors surrounding the formation of nation states in Africa prominent among which was the partition of the continent by the European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885. This conference was to change the course of events in Africa. It brought people with different and antagonistic ideologies together under single states without putting in place mechanisms to ensure harmonious existence among them. This was the starting point of recurrent conflicts and crises in Africa.
In the Post Cold War era, African conflicts and crises have been largely intrastate except the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and that of the DRC (Salim, 2002:33). They have also been too frequent that the AU appears overwhelmed. The recurrence of conflicts in the continent has become a factor for the assumption that AU mechanisms for conflict management are perhaps deficient in some respects.
If the AU must improve on its mechanisms for conflict management and peace support operations, the challenges confronting the organisation need to be identified with a view to working out a better approach. It is in this context that this research examines the issues and prospects of AU crisis management.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The following under listed are the objectives of this research:
(1) To discuss the AU mechanisms for crisis and conflict management in Africa.
(2) To discuss the challenges of the current AU conflict management mechanisms.
(3) Examine the prospects of enhancing AU mechanisms for crises management in the continent.
(4) To suggest possible ways on how best to improve the AU mechanisms for crises management.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The importance of this study is appreciable in the fact that:
(1) The AU Secretariat staff and policy makers would benefit from it as it presents viable prospects to address issues raised.
(2) It will also contribute to the existing body of knowledge on crises management by the AU in Africa.
(3) It will serve as reference material for further research in the area of crises management.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
This research covers events in Africa regarding conflicts from 2000 to 2008. This period provides room for assessing the efficiency of AU mechanisms for crisis management from her inception to date.
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The study faced with some limitations. This arose from the inability of the researcher to interview key individuals who are stakeholders in crisis management under the auspices of the AU. However, a few interviews of past officials of the AU and some diplomats as well as military personnel who had participated in AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) assisted in the attainment of the research objectives.
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study answered the following research questions:
(1) Is there any significant relationship between AU mechanisms for crisis management and crisis management in Africa?
(2) Are AU mechanisms for crisis management in Africa effective?
(3) Are there challenges and prospects of AU mechanisms for crisis management in Africa?
(4) Are there other measures that could be adopted by the AU to make its mechanisms for crisis management more effective in the continent?
1.8 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The study tested the following hypotheses:
(1) HO – The AU mechanisms for crisis management is not faced with challenges in managing crisis in Africa.
(2) HA – The AU mechanisms for crisis management is faced with challenges in managing crisis in Africa.
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research needs to identify the issues and prospects of AU mechanisms for crisis management. To do this, an authentic and reliable research methodology is needed. This focuses on the steps taken by the researcher in conducting the study. This includes the identification of variables, research design, area of study, population, sample and sampling techniques. The methodology also covers the instruments for data collection, validation and reliability of the instruments, methods of data collection, method of data analysis and weaknesses of the methodology.
1.9.1 Identification of the Variables
The variables in this research are qualitative in nature because they vary in kind rather than in magnitude. The independent variable is crisis management while the dependent variable is AU mechanism. Therefore, the more efficient AU Mechanism is the more effective crisis management in Africa will be.
1.9.2 Research Design
Due to the complex nature of crisis management in Africa, the researcher adopted a combination of historical, descriptive and experimental research methods in this work. The historical method allowed the researcher to determine what led to existing mechanisms for crisis management by the AU while the descriptive method made it possible to determine the nature of existing mechanisms. The descriptive research design includes survey research, case study, developmental studies, correlation studies and causal comparative or ex-post factor studies. However, the survey method was used in this study. This enabled the researcher to administer questionnaires to many respondents concurrently.
The experimental method enabled the researcher to employ both the historical and descriptive values to discover the challenges of AU. It also assisted the researcher to predict the prospect of crisis management by the AU as well as make some recommendations. Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to identify and test the cause and effect relationship between the independent and the dependent variables.
1.9.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques
The sample used in this study included military personnel that participated in AU Peace Support Operations (PSO). Others include diplomats, university lecturers and persons with relevant experience in the field of crisis management. Thus, stratified random sampling technique was used for selection of sample from the population. This was to ensure that relevant characteristics like social status, ranks, participation in AU PSOs and other important factors were considered. The selection also considered educational background of the sample population. This ensured that each category of the sample was proportionally represented. The sampling technique used in this work therefore guaranteed the representation of all relevant interest groups.
1.9.4 Instruments of Data Collection
A combination of researcher-designed questionnaire and unstructured interviews were used for data collection. A sample copy of the questionnaire and the questions asked during the unstructured interviews are at Appendixes II and III respectively. The questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first section contained information on the personal profile of the respondent. The personal profile information included age, occupation, rank, academic qualification and participation in AU PSO. The second section consisted a twenty nine item questionnaire structure, placed in a four point-scale of Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Strongly Disagree (SD) and Disagree (D).
1.9.5 Method of Data Collection
The data used in this work were collected through unstructured interviews, discussions, consultations and administration of questionnaires. The research adopted the structured interview method for two main reasons. Firstly, crisis management is a government policy and therefore a sensitive national and international issue. Hence, a respondent might not likely accept responsibility for some comments that could have emanated from a structured interview. The unstructured interview therefore allowed some of the sources to address the research questions using their words. Secondly, some primary sources due to their busy schedule may lack time to complete the structured questionnaires. Hence, the interview assisted the researcher in obtaining information from busy resource persons.
The structured questionnaires, on the other hand, were used, to permit for easier scientific analysis of the research findings. They also assisted in revealing different view points thereby taking care of likely biases that might be contained in some of the secondary sources. Data for this study were, therefore, obtained from both primary and secondary sources.
Primary data was derived from unstructured interviews with the former Ambassador and Special Representative of Nigeria to the UN, Chief Arthur Mbanefo. The former Nigerian Defence Attache to Ethiopia and member of the AU Military Staff Centre, Brig Gen Ahmad T Jibrin, a former Head of Mission to the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), Ambassador Babagana Kingibe as well as Capt Aliyu S Aliyu, a onetime Information Analysis Officer of the AU Darfur Integrated Task Force were also interviewed The researcher interviewed these diplomats and official because of the roles they might have played in crisis management while working at the UN and AU. This gave a broad picture of the efforts of AU in crisis management. A focused group discussions with some diplomats and other relevant people were also utilized as a means of acquiring data.
The researcher also administered questionnaires to some lecturers of strategic studies at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, University of Abuja and National Defence College Abuja. Some questionnaires were also administered to some military personnel in Kaduna, Abuja and Jaji cantonment that had participated in AU PSO. Additionally, the researcher used his personal experience having served as a member of Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT) 10, AMIS from February to July 2006.
Secondary sources were obtained from the libraries at AFCSC Jaji, NDC Abuja, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Lagos and and the Kaduna State Library. The Internet was also extensively used. Such sources included books, unpublished works, journals, magazines, newspapers, lecture texts and seminar papers. Others included official documents of the AU and some IGO’s.
1.9.6 Methods of Data Analysis
Data collected was analysed graphically using tables and charts. This gave a symbolic representation of the data gathered. Statistical method using Chi-square was also used to test whether the hypotheses were to be accepted or not. One of the weaknesses of the methodology used is that the researcher might not have come in contact with the most appropriate respondents that have the right information during the survey. Secondly, the respondents might be reluctant to disclose their true feelings particularly on sensitive issues, like policies on crisis management. Finally, some respondents might have faked their responses to the research questionnaires just to satisfy the researcher’s need. However, using various instruments for data collection, gaps that might have emanated from any of the instruments used were taken care of. This enhanced the reliability of the methodology adopted in this work.
1.10 PROPOSITIONS
1. AU mechanisms for conflict resolutions are deficient.
2. The AU like OAU uses the Euro-centric model of conventional security strategy for conflict management.
3. It is time to apply the economic developmental approach or grand strategy as a mechanism for AU’s conflict management.
1.11 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
For the purpose of this study the following terms are defined as follows:
1. Conflict: Conflict is a situation in which 2 or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both, each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to the goal.
2. Conflict Prevention: Conflict prevention activities are normal conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from diplomatic initiatives to preventative deployment of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring. Preventive deployment within the framework of conflict prevention is the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to avoid a conflict.
3. Crisis: Crisis is an extreme situation of conflict which has reached a turning point, where critical decisions have to be taken or else the conflict escalates to a point of extreme violence. It is a degenerated state of conflict, where threats to human security, intense violence, characterized by fighting, death, injury and large scale-displacement of populations among others, occur.
4. Crisis Management: Crisis management refers to measures to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a crisis or the threat of a crisis. It involves measures aimed at de-escalating crisis situation and bringing cessation of violence. The necessary agencies of law and order are therefore used to contain such situations. These include the police and members of the armed force to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a crisis or the threat of a crisis. The central issue is balance between national strategy, interests and objectives, and actions taken to prevent war.
5. Humanitarian Operations: Humanitarian operations are conducted to relieve human suffering. Military humanitarian activities may accompany, or be in support of humanitarian operations conducted by specialized civilian organizations.
6. Peace: Peace is a process involving activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and in the wider international community.
7. Peace Building: Peace building covers actions which support political, economic, social and military measures as well as structures, aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlement in order to redress the causes of conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structure which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confident and well being, and support economic reconstruction.
8. Peace Enforcement: Peace Enforcement (PE) operations are coercive in nature and undertaken under Chapter VII of UN Charter when the consent of any of the major parties to the conflict is uncertain. They are designed to maintain and re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.
9. Peace Keeping: Peacekeeping (PK) operations are general undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter with consent of all the major parties to a conflict, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.
10. Peace Making: Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation and sanctions.
11. Peace Support Operations: Peace Support Operations (PSO) are multi-functional operations involving military forces as well as diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. They are designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a long-term political settlement, and are conducted impartially in support of a mandate. These include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.
12. Preventive Diplomacy: Preventive diplomacy is the attempt to make official policy out of conflict prevention. It is defined as actions taken to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into crisis and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
13. Violence: Violence is the detrimental use of legally and morally prohibited force against humanity by humanity. It involves the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desires of others.
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