BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS TERRITORIAL CHANGE IN TROPICAL AFRICA, 1905-1914

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BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS TERRITORIAL CHANGE IN TROPICAL AFRICA, 1905-1914

ABSTRACT

Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, the (proving awareness of Britain’s isolation in Europe and the pressures ethno faced in the colonial field,both in Africa and the European, led to a move by some British Statesman, notably Joseph Chamberlain, for a rapprochement with one European Croat Power. Attempts were made to establish such a relationship with Germany, but those failed because of the divergences in policies and objectives of tho two powers, Britain, however, succeeded for various reasons which have been made clear in the text, in effecting” a rapprochement with France based on an understanding on some reconcilable colonial interests in Africa. This understanding, tho Entente Cordials of 1904 later led to a closer alignment of Anglo-French, not only in Europe but also in Africa. This had sorno relevance for Africa. The partition had loft some unresolved questions such as frontier rectifications and anomalies like extensive territories under weak rulers Come of the frontier rectifications went beyond mere local delimitations and they raised issues of territorial change, while the territories of weak powers were under constant throat of despoliation by their more powerful rivals. Xn resolving these problems, while it tended to prefer tho maintenance of the territorial status QUO, the attitude of tho Foreign Office was /proved by its appreciation of the relationship between Britain and the two other Great Powers, Germany and France. Thus, although irritations continued between France and Britain, these never got out of hand; and Britain was able to overlook some of the excesses france in certain areas, for example in Liberia. With regard to Germany, resentment against tho blackmailing tactics practised by Bismarck ami the available rivalry between the two powers, engendered less generosity or understanding from Britain On frontier -questions tho Germans always seeded to be overstating their case; the question of tiffin Day or ceding this territory to Germany was soon as strengthening the enemy Tn 1911, however, British support for Franco during the Agadir crisis the criticisms which it evoked from radicals and liberals, led the government to review its general policy, The strident cries of Germans for a pl-oe in the sun found a responsive chord in Britain. There was a foolinr that Germany had not had a fair chare of Africa, and, some argued this was ono reason for her aggressive demands. It was suggested that colonial concessions might evoke come flexibility in German caval policy. Some, notably Lulu lfercourt, even hoped that the colonial detente mi«ht lead be wider fields. The literature of the period was full of Suggestions for the repartition of Africa in which the Just demands of the powers could be satisfied and peace in Europe preserved. The idea was to uoe Africa as a safety valve. Criteria. of Grey’, policy aid not induce th. Liberal government to Chang, the lives of its foreign policy, out it Bad. a.mo mo-e to roach, an Undemanding with Carmany. Britain was prepared to accommodate Germany in colonial matters and to agree to n political formula, if Germany would modify its naval policy. Eventually, there was no headway in the naval Political talk.. this proved wrong the assumption that an offer of colonial concessions would Germany to modify her Kavy programme negotiations on a colonial agreement, essentially the revision of the Secret Treaty of 1890, ware pushed ahead hy Ilarcourt’o enthusiasm for an Anglo-German understanding. The experiment was not easy to carry out| not on’y were there strong material reasons militating against a colonial d.al or a re partition of Africa, hut, more important, there were very strong objections in terms of general policy and strategy, from various if ranee. Although this movement for a re partition of Africa dooa indicate that, many people, including Statesmen, believed that some of the somalis left the nineteenth Century partition could he rectified,

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