NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF NIGER DELTA (MEND)

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NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF NIGER DELTA (MEND)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background of the study

Since independence in 1960, insecurity has been a feature of the Nigerian State as conflicts in different parts of the country have continued to make life insecure. In the Niger Delta, violence has been the bane of the region where conflicts have been occurring for over four decades. Beginning from the pre-colonial period, the region has witnessed a series of conflicts, which had their roots, initially in the protest against injustice, and in recent years in the quest for resource control. All efforts to resolve conflict in the region failed until 2009 when amnesty was declared by the Yar’adua/Jonathan administration and some form of uneasy peace prevailed. However, seven years down the line, there is renewed militancy in the region and effort is once again geared towards finding lasting peace. This article assesses the efforts made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to address conflicts in the region from the early 1960s to date. It is based on a literature study and on the author’s knowledge of the issues in the Niger Delta. Findings from the work show that the Federal Government’s approach to resolving conflict in the region has not been successful because it has not adequately addressed the issues that gave rise to the conflict, and because of its emphasis on the use of force. The article therefore recommends a Collective Non-violent Conflict Management approach – involving a group of negotiators, both international and local, an international mediator, as well as all the parties to the conflict – as the means for resolving conflict in the region. There is no doubt that a viable resource conflict strategy based on an alternative framework of multilateral cooperation is necessary for resolving and preventing a recurrence of future conflict in the Niger Delta region.

Introduction The Niger Delta region of Nigeria, located in the south-south zone of the country, is the region that produces oil – the lifeline of the Nigerian economy. Since 1956, when oil was discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri in present day Bayesa state, Hydrocarbon resources have been the engines for Nigeria’s economy, as oil provides 95% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and 80% of the government’s budgetary revenues (Davis 2010:1–2). According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, Nigeria’s oil production accounts for 8% of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Corporation’s (OPEC) total daily production and 3% of the world’s volume. However, the discovery of oil, which was expected to improve the lot of the communities where it is sourced, has become a curse rather than a blessing because of oil exploration activities and its attendant hazards, such as air and water pollution. This has led to the indigenous people demanding compensation as well as control of the oil wealth. This demand has led to a confrontation between activists and Multinational Oil Companies operating in the region as well as the Federal Government. The struggle which started as a peaceful protest metamorphosed into armed conflict after the killing of a renowned activist and playwright in the region, Ken Sara-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni men. The new wave of protests after this has included the abduction of foreign oil workers, bombing of oil installations and destruction of lives and property.

In 2009, the Federal Government interceded with an amnesty programme under former President Musa Yar’adua and his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan. The amnesty, which was proposed to last for five years, required that repentant militants surrendered their arms in return for unconditional national pardon. This exercise witnessed a total of 26 808 militants surrendering their arms and ammunition and being granted amnesty, which involved co-opting or integrating them into the society as well as training them (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2016:1). While amnesty lasted, there was some reprieve as militants sheathed their swords. However, there has been recourse to arms in the region in recent times as new militant groups emerged in 2016 with various demands. While the new names that emerged this time differ from the past ones, there is no doubt that this was old wine in new bottles. The new militants are still insisting on resource control and bombing of oil installations, which is re-immersing the country in conflict once again. The Federal Government in its bid to check this has been returning fire for fire by constituting a military operation code-named operation ‘Crocodile Smiles’, which the militants and many analysts feel is not the answer to the problem of conflict in the region. This article is an attempt to assess the Federal Government’s approach to tackling the new wave of militancy in the region. The study proposes a Collective Non-violent Conflict Management approach involving local and foreign negotiators, an international mediator and the parties to the conflict working together to find a lasting solution to the conflict. The choice of this approach is based on the fact that many of the strategies (violent and non-violent) adopted in the past to resolve conflict in the region have not achieved the purpose.

Statement of the problem

There may have been previous researches in this subject. This work gives further explanations and analysis in national security role of the movement for the emancipation of niger delta (mend)

Objectives of the study
To understand the impact of movement for the emancipation of Niger delta on the national security
To understand the relationship between movement for the emancipation of Niger delta on the national security

Research questions
What is the impact of movement for the emancipation of Niger delta on the national security
What is the relationship between movement for the emancipation of Niger delta on the national security

Research hypothesis

H0: There is no relationship between movement for the emancipation of Niger delta on the national security

H1: There is a relationship between movement for the emancipation of Niger delta on the national security

CHAPTER TWO

Literature review

Conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta The Niger Delta region of Nigeria comprises the nine states Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. About 31 million people live in the region which is renowned as one of the World’s ten most important wetland and coastal marine ecosystems. The Niger Delta is rich with a diverse mosaic of ecological zones, five of which are the Mangrove Forest and Coastal Vegetation Zone, the Fresh Water Swamp Forest Zone, the Lowland Rain Forest Zone, the Derived Savannah Zone and the Montane Zone. The Niger Delta is also the location of massive oil deposits, which have been extracted for decades by the government of Nigeria and by Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) (Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Ojua 2013:2). Since 1970, the country has earned at least $300 billion from energy development and in 2005 it made $450 billion. With about 40 million barrels of proven oil reserves, it currently produces 2.4 million barrels of oil per day, which constitutes about 90% of the government’s revenue and 95% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings (Ajodo 2002:6). Nigeria is West Africa’s biggest producer of petroleum and the sixth largest supplier of oil in the world, thanks to oil from the Niger Delta. Oil wealth has been instrumental to Nigeria’s emergence as a leading player in world and regional politics. Specifically, Nigeria has been playing a leading and dynamic role in African politics as a member of several regional organisations, such as the Africa Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and an active role in global politics under the United Nations. With the oil boom in the early 1970s, Nigeria began to assert her influence around the globe and to date whatever influence Nigeria has, is credited to the discovery and exploration of oil.

However, the region which bears this economically important oil has been enmeshed in conflicts for more than four decades – owing to the negative impact of oil exploration. The region is a tale of poverty, squalor and gross underdevelopment in the midst of plenty, due to environmental degradation which has affected the people’s agricultural means of livelihood. The effect of oil spills and gas flares has been death to aquatic lives and waste to farm lands. It is on record that more gas is flared in Nigeria than anywhere else in the World (Nore and Turner 1980). It is on record that the oil industry in the Niger Delta is one of the worst cases in the world of gas flaring. Nigeria is the second largest offending country, after Russia, in terms of the total volume of gas flared and the resulting emission of about 70 million tons of CO2 a year, higher than the emissions in Norway (Worgu 2000). In the case of oil spills, Nigeria has the highest number of oil spills in the world; between 9 million and 13 million barrels of oil have been spilled in the Niger Delta (although the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) puts the amount of petroleum spilled in the area between 1976 and 1996 at 1.8 million out of a total of 2.4 million) (Ajodo 2012). A UNDP report states that more than 6 800 spills were recorded in the area between 1976 and 2001 while the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC) places the quantity of petroleum spilled into the environment yearly at 2 300 cubic metres, with an average 300 industrial spills annually. The World Bank however believes that the amount of oil spills could be ten times higher than the officially released figures. Erosion, canalisation, intra- and inter-communal conflicts between host communities are also some effects of oil explorations in the region. This has led to protests by the indigenous people, leading in turn to full blown conflicts.

Conflicts in the Niger Delta have been occurring as far back as the pre-colonial period and the early 1960s when there were protests against the marginalisation of the region. In the early 1990s, there were also non-violent protests in Ogoniland to protest against the degradation of the environment by Oil companies. After these series of uprisings, a new wave of protests characterised by militancy began in 2003. Violence during this period grew out of the political campaigns in 2003. As they competed for office, politicians in Rivers State manipulated the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), led by Ateke Tom, and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, and used these groups to advance their aspirations, often rewarding gang members for acts of political violence and intimidation against their opponents (Bekoe 2005). This eventually witnessed the emergence of other militant groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF) which unleashed mayhem on the region. This introduced militancy into the region which was characterised by armed attacks, bombing of oil installations and hostage taking, particularly of foreign oil workers – thereby ushering in a Hobbesian Niger Delta (Ibeanu 2006:9). For several years, the region was characterised by insecurity; and at the height of the crisis, the situation was dreaded by Nigerian citizens and foreigners alike. As a result, many people fled their communities and many foreign businesses were relocated to their home countries.

To address the state of insecurity in the region, the Federal Government in 2009 proposed an amnesty programme which witnessed a large number of militants surrendering their arms in return for training by the government. Under the programme, many repentant militants were trained within and outside the country and during the period, relative peace returned to the region. However, this has been short-lived as there has been the emergence of new militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the Red Egbesu Water Lions, Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF), Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS) and the Adaka Boro Avengers in 2016. These new groups have continued from where the former militant groups left off with renewed bombing of oil installations and abduction of oil workers. Several lives have been lost including those of militants and security operatives, and insecurity has become the order of the day once again in the Niger Delta. Apart from death that has occurred as a result of confrontation with the militants, security operations have failed due to the risks involved.

For instance, in 2016, about four members of the Operation Crocodile Smile died when their boat capsized while they were on patrol. There has also been destruction of property worth millions of naira. Militancy was indeed taking its toll on the Nigerian economy with the country losing over N1.8 billion daily due to attacks on oil installations by militants (Okinbaloye 2016). The government has responded to the attacks by matching force with force, a step which analysts have criticised as not helping to achieve the goal of enduring peace in the region.

Amnesty represented an opportunity to stabilise the region for constructive conflict resolution negotiations. It was not the first time that an amnesty initiative had been put forward to resolve the violence in the region, but this time it was an offer backed with solid proposals for the necessary disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the region’s militants (Davis 2010). Despite this, however, the programme was not able to address regional violence, largely due to the lack of attention to the peculiar type of conflict in the Delta and the issues that gave rise to it. Thus, in order to fully appreciate the task of conflict resolution there, it is important to look at past attempts at conflict resolution in order to consider ideas for the future.

Theorising conflict in the Niger Delta region Scholars are unanimous in their views that the end of the Cold War and economic globalisation in the 1990s have had a significant impact on warfare globally and that the search for appropriate theories to explain this has contributed to the growing debate on the importance of natural resources as drivers of violent conflicts (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001; De Soysa 2002:1; Berdal 2003). Empirical studies have also shown that natural resources underlie territorial struggles which have been the most prevalent form of conflict all through history (USIP 2007:11; Alao 2007:1). Extant literature on conflicts, particularly in Africa, suggests that an overwhelming percentage of these conflicts are resource-based (De Soysa 2002; Blench 2006). According to a recent United Nations report in Sylvester (2012), in the last sixty years at least 40% of civil wars on the African continent have been connected with natural resources. Even in the natural sciences, there is a consensus that competition over scarce natural resources is one of the key drivers of violent conflict within and across species (Bhattacharyya 2015). Similarly, studies by the World Bank (2003) and others have shown that countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities (Nigeria, Sudan, Chechnya, Liberia, Indonesia and Angola for instance) are highly prone to civil violence, and that those with oil and natural gas are the most conflict prone (Bannon and Collier 2003:ix). Nigeria is the 12th largest producer of petroleum and its 8th largest exporter worldwide. Resource-related conflict in Nigeria revolves around oil with about 95% of violent conflict in Nigeria since 1997 being resource-related (Kishi 2014). Studies also found that the fight for resource control strengthens the segmentation around already existing ethnic or linguistic cleavages thereby escalating conflict (Gleditsch and Urdal 2002:286; Gurr and Harff 1994). Against this background, this work adopts a combination of eco-violence and psychological primordial theories.

Eco-violence, also known as environmental conflict, theory was developed by Homer-Dixon (1999:30) in his attempt to explain the causal relationship between natural resource endowment and the outbreak of violent conflict.

According to him,

Decrease in the quality and quantity of renewable resources act singly or in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population groups, of vegetation, farmland, water, forests etc. This scarcity of ecological resources can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger regional and national economies. Consequently, the affected people may migrate or be expelled to new lands … while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1999:30).

The central argument of the theory is that declining availability of renewable natural resources, which results in competition over scarce resources, engender violent conflict (Ajaero et al. 2015:471). This view was expressed by Annan (2006) when he stated that ‘environmental degradation in forms such as desertification, resource depletion and demographic pressure exacerbates tensions and instability …’. Michael (2001) also noted that:

Competition over the control of valuable oil supplies and pipeline routes has emerged as a particularly acute source of conflict in the 21st century. With the demand for oil growing and many older sources of supply (such as those in the United States, Mexico, and China) in decline, the pressure on remaining supplies, notably those in the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian Sea basin, South America, and Africa, is growing ever more intense.

This is seen from competition in Africa over the revenue generated from scarce natural resources which has led to violent conflict in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Nigeria (Bhattacharyya 2015). The foregoing aptly describes the situation in the Niger Delta where oil exploration activities leading to environmental degradation such as shortage of farmlands, death of aquatic life, air and water pollution, oil poisoning causing respiratory ailments and destruction of mangrove forests, often without adequate compensation, have resulted in conflict. This was why the late environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, lamented that the people of the region faced extinction in what he described as an ecological war (Saro-Wiwa, cited in Na’Allah 1998).

Increasing frustration emanating from oil exploration has led to violent resistance which has culminated in conflict in the region between locals represented by militants and oil corporations operating in the region.

Psychological/primordial theorists, on the other hand, are of the view that humans have a deep-rooted psychological need to dichotomise and to establish enemies and allies, which leads to the formation of ethnic and national group identities and behaviours. How a group perceives itself and its relationship with those outside the group determines whether their relationship will be based on cooperation, competition or conflict. Usually those within the group are regarded as better than those outside, and this leads to ‘me-you’, ‘we-they’ ‘insiders-outsiders’ and ‘minority-majority’ sentiments. In the Niger Delta, conflicts are generated by grievances about natural resources (which border on demands for ownership of the resource concerned), the distribution of resource revenues and about environmental and social damage caused by extracting the resource. In Nigeria, the Federal Government is the one responsible for resource allocation and control, but conflict has arisen over the most appropriate revenue sharing formula with the Niger Delta people who demand that a special proportion be given to them due to their oil richness – just as it was done for the north when agricultural produce was the mainstay of the economy (Sheriff et al. 2014:75). This demand has however been refused by Nigerians in the rest of the country and by some of the leaders. The result was the above-mentioned primordial sentiments of group versus group, which led to the creation of ethno-nationalism-identities (Kasomo 2012:1; Alao 2007:159). We see this in the confrontation between foreign oil companies and local communities in the Niger Delta and between the Niger Delta people who view themselves as minorities being marginalised and oppressed and the ‘majorities’ in the other parts of the country that do not produce oil but reap the benefits of revenue allocation. Consequently, there have been violent agitations in the form of militancy and a call for secession by the Niger Delta buttressing the argument of Bannon and Collier (2003:5) that violent secessionist movements are statistically much more likely if a country has valuable natural resources, especially oil.

Efforts by the Nigerian government to address conflicts in the Niger Delta Various efforts, beginning even before independence, have been made by the Federal Government to end the conflicts in the region. In 1957, the government established the Willink Commission to look into the problems of the minorities, and this Commission acknowledged the utter neglect of the region and, among other proposals, recommended the creation of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB). This Board could not achieve its aims for many reasons, one of which was the fact that its headquarters were located in Lagos, far from the problem area. With the creation of twelve states in 1967 and the establishment of the Niger Delta River Basin Authority (NDRBA), the NNDB became obsolete. In the second republic, a 1.5% Federation Account for the development of the Niger Delta region was set up for the oil producing areas, but because of the constraint of operating from its secretariat in Lagos it was not able to achieve its purpose.

In spite of recurrent failures, and in order to show its commitment to ending the crisis and ensuring the development of the area, the Federal Government established some other Commissions such as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) which was in operation from 1992 to 1999. OMPADEC was set up by the Ibrahim Babangida Administration under the chairmanship of Chief Albert Horsefall. Like its predecessors, it failed to achieve its mandate owing to official profligacy, corruption, excessive political interference and lack of transparency. After this, the Niger Delta Environmental Survey was set up in 1995, followed by the Niger Delta Development Commission, established in 2000 by President OlusegunObasanjo with a vision ‘to offer a lasting solution to socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region’ and a mission ‘to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful’ (Niger Delta Development Commission 2000:103). The government also put in place other mechanisms such as the Task Force on Pipeline Vandalisation (April 2000) operated by the Nigeria Police Force in collaboration with the NNPC (Niger Delta Development Commission 2001). Similar task forces were also set up by the navy, army and State Security Service (SSS) in various states of the Niger Delta. In Delta state, the government passed a law in August 2001 banning militant groups blamed for the disruption of oil activities in the state. The Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas was also set up by the Federal Government in November 2001 to address the prevailing situation in the oil producing areas. Other efforts include the convening of the first Niger Delta peace conference in Abuja in 2007, a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2008, and a Technical Committee made up of stakeholders and the Niger Delta ministry in 2008.

Amnesty and post-amnesty era Following criticisms of the military option, especially when it became obvious that the use of force by the JTF was aggravating rather than resolving the conflict, an amnesty programme was set up by the Federal Government on 25 May 2009 under the leadership of a former president, Umar Musa Yar’Adua. Amnesty was the Federal Government’s effort towards bringing enduring peace, security, stability and development to the region.

It involved granting of national and unconditional pardon to all armed militants in the Niger Delta region who in turn were to surrender their arms and ammunition, sign an undertaking not to return to the creeks and continue with the struggle and also sign the military re-unification forms. Amnesty followed the recommendations contained in the 2008 report by the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) initially established by the Federal Government, and chaired by MOSOP president Ledum Mitee, to assess initiatives taken in the region and provide for a comprehensive report and recommendations. The 45-member committee was inaugurated on 8 September 2008 to collate and review all past reports in the Niger Delta, appraise their recommendations and make other proposals that will help the Federal Government achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta Region (Mitee 2009). The amnesty programme included a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process.

The first stage of the programme led to 26 808 ex-combatants accepting the offer. Of them, 20 192 accepted the offer on or before 4th October 2009 and 6 616 during November 2009 (Ejovi and Ebie 2013). The second stage involved government setting up demobilisation camps for the demilitarisation and rehabilitation of the ex-militants; while the third stage involved government’s engagement with the leadership of the combatants and ex-combatants, as well as non-combatant youths, for employment and socio-economic empowerment. This therefore brought an end to the spate of bombing and kidnappings in the region, and led to an increase in oil outputs. Despite this seeming success, amnesty was alleged to be riddled with cases of corruption which made it less effective than it should have been. As a result, five years after amnesty new militant groups emerged in the region, namely; the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), The Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF), the Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS), the AdakaBoro Avengers (ABA) and the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDGJM). In response, the Federal Government deployed 3 000 military personnel to the region with a plan to deploy 10 000 more by the year 2017 in addition to launching Operation Crocodile Smileaimed at restoring peace to the region (Utebor 2016). Criticisms have however followed the deployment of troops and particularly the use of force in the region. Critics are of the view that the new security measures will further worsen the security situation in the region and they therefore called for dialogue. In response to this call, the government proposed a $10 billion (N4 trillion) infrastructural rebirth investment programme for the region. Leaders and stakeholders from the region rejected this, however, on the grounds that they were not consulted before it was proposed (Omotayo 2016). In addition, the Federal Government in November 2016, convened a peace dialogue in which President Buhari met with leaders from the region in Abuja to discuss the way forward. At the meeting, leaders of the region led by Edwin Clark presented a 16-point agenda to the Federal Government and although the president welcomed the requests in addition to stating that the reports of amnesty would be implemented, peace remains elusive. Some critics have attributed the rise in militancy to the failure of the 13% derivation principle and amnesty to produce development in the region. The result has been pressure and a call for ‘resource control’ or ‘fiscal federalism’ (Akintunde and Hile 2016).

Recommending the collective non-violent approach to conflict management in the Niger Delta There is no gainsaying that many strategies have been put in place to resolve the ongoing imbroglio in the Niger Delta. However, these efforts have failed to have the desired effect of ushering in the needed peace. The failure of the various strategies is probably due to the fact that they lacked sufficient elements of democracy, accountability, equity and active public participation of all stakeholders (Ako 2011), which is why Abidde (2009) opined that ‘peace cannot be dictated; it has to be a natural born child of a just and humane environment’. In view of this situation, this article proposes Collective Non-violent Conflict Management (CNCM) as an alternative approach. This approach is based on collective or cooperative problem solving to conflict management. CNCM is a multilateral non-violent and democratic approach to conflict resolution involving a team of negotiators, a mediator and parties to a dispute working together to find a lasting solution. It is an emerging phenomenon in international relations and combines the elements of non-violence such as dialogue, negotiation and mediation in resolving conflict, building trust and seeking a ‘win-win’ solution (Crocker et al. 2011:51). Non-violence as an ideology and a practice is not a new approach to conflict resolution but has been accepted for decades. It rejects the use of violence as a conflict resolution mechanism and serves as a potent force for resolving conflict and bringing about social change (Jaspreet 2012:7). CNCM as an approach is similar to the Collective Conflict Management (CCM) approach of Crocker and others (2011:51), which involves countries, international and regional/sub-regional organisations, and, importantly, Non-governmental Organisations or private actors addressing potential or actual security threats in a concerted action to:

control, diminish or end violence associated with conflict through combined peace operations and/or mediation, conflict prevention and avoidance; assist, where appropriate, with a negotiated settlement through peacebuilding, cross-border management and other cooperative efforts and measures; help address the political, economic and/or social issues that underlie the conflict; and/or provide political, diplomatic and economic guarantees or other long-term measures to improve local security conditions which involve international, regional/sub-regional and local actors and institutions supporting negotiation to end a conflict. CNCM is a multilateral arrangement involving all parties in the conflict management process working together with parties to the conflict to find solutions to their problems. Negotiation is facilitated by a mediator acceptable to both parties. The mediator is a neutral person and a national of another country. The approach is voluntary, informal, improvised and adapted to the ad hoc situation; and because of the peculiarity and distinctiveness of each region, it is most effective when it occurs within regions (Crocker et al. 2011:51). Negotiations should preferably take place on neutral ground, for instance in a neighbouring country. In the case of the Niger Delta conflict, Ghana provides an appropriate location for negotiations.

The multilateral approach to conflict resolution has been found to be best suited for resolving natural resource conflicts in the 21st century (Mwanika 2010:7; Pynn 2011). Multilateral non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms have been successfully used in the Liberia peace process, the Philippines–Mindanao talks, the Afghanistan–Pakistan border dispute and the Horn of Africa Piracy (Crocker et al. 2011:46–49).

Characteristics of the collective non-violent approach

It is usually undertaken by an ad-hoc arrangement or coalition that deals with specific security challenges and immediate conflict management needs in the situation concerned. It is a democratic problem-solving approach that gives parties to a conflict equal opportunity to participate in finding common solutions to their problems. It involves communicating face-to-face with one another, dialoguing, and negotiating, thereby building trust. This is very important in the Niger Delta case as the issue of lack of trust on both sides has impeded the process of dialogue. It is particularly effective when one or more key actors at the official or unofficial level are prepared to take the lead and mobilise partners who are willing to support a shared undertaking. It comprises peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes from their inception to their conclusion, including the implementation of formal peace settlements which has been lacking in the peace processes in the Niger Delta so far. Challenges of the collective non-violent approach

It needs a supportive environment as parties to the dispute must agree to the process and cooperate with the team otherwise it would not succeed. Because of the issue of sovereignty, a State may be reluctant to adopt an approach that may been seen as foreign interference in its domestic politics.

It is expensive as it requires using a neutral location such as another country and paying members of the team of negotiators and the mediator.

It requires members to have the right skills and resources for the success of the task at hand and as a result it needs long-term planning, training and mobilisation of resources which depend on availability of funds.

It is ineffective where one or more key actors are not prepared to take the lead and mobilise partners for the task.

Conclusion Five years after the declaration of amnesty, there has been a resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta region. Although many claim it is in response to the government’s anti-corruption stance, the new wave of militancy is worrisome as the region is once again back to the old days of violence and insecurity characterised by abductions and vandalism of oil and gas pipelines. Conflict in the region is adversely affecting the Nigerian economy at a time when the price of crude oil has plummeted and there are calls for diversification of the economy. Furthermore, insecurity in the region is compounding an already tense and insecure political climate in the country and this is further being heightened by the use of force by federal troops. The use of force has never been found to be a solution for problems such as those of the Niger Delta and therefore a multilateral non-violent approach is recommended. A cooperative approach to resource conflict management is not only necessary for avoiding conflict and addressing social and environmental crises, but it would also salvage significant financial resources and foster goodwill among parties to the dispute.

The group’s efforts are directed towards knocking down oil production in the Niger-Delta region and claims to expose exploitation and oppression of the people of the Niger-Delta and devastation of the natural environment as a result of public-private partnerships between the Federal Government of Nigeria and corporations involved in the production of oil in the Niger Delta. Its composition includes members of the Ijaw who accuse the government and overseas oil firms with promoting massive economic inequalities, fraud, and environmental degradation. MEND’s methods include kidnap-for-ransom of oil workers, staging armed assaults on production sites, pipeline destruction, murder of Nigerian police officers, and draining off of oil and sell it to the black market.[2]

MEND’s other goals include localizing control of Nigeria’s oil and securing reparations from the federal government for pollution caused by the oil industry. In an interview with one of the group’s leaders, who used the alias Major-General Godswill Tamuno, the BBC reported that MEND was fighting for “total control” of the Niger-Delta’s oil wealth, saying local people had not gained from the riches under the ground and the region’s creeks and swamps.”[3]

MEND has been linked to attacks on petroleum operations in Nigeria as part of the conflict in the Niger-Delta, engaging in actions including sabotage, theft, property destruction, guerrilla warfare, and kidnapping.[4]

In a January 2006 email, MEND warned the oil industry —

“It must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. Leave our land while you can or die in it…. Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil.”[5]

Additionally MEND called upon then President, Olusegun Obasanjo, to free two jailed Ijaw leaders — Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, who was in jail at the time on charges of treason, and Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, a former governor of Bayelsa State convicted of corruption. Obasanjo’s successor, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua authorised the release of Dokubo-Asari and Alamieyeseigha in 2007.[6]

Recent tactics

MEND’s attacks involve substantially more sophisticated tactics than those of previous militant groups in the Niger Delta. MEND’s recent tactics include:

Swarm-based maneuvers, where guerrillas use speed boats in the Niger Delta’s swamps to quickly attack targets in succession. Multiple, highly maneuverable units have kept the government and Shell’s defensive systems off-balance in defending their sprawling networks;

Radically-improved firepower and combat training which allow guerrillas to overpower a combination of Shell’s Western-trained private military guards and elite Nigerian units in several engagements;

Effective use of system disruption, in this method, targets have been systematically and accurately selected to completely shut down production and delay and/or halt repairs and make effective use of Shell’s hostages to coerce both the government and the multinational.[7]

The militant group has repeatedly bombed pipelines, triggering an international increase in the cost of oil.

Origins and context

For the roughly fifty years since Nigeria declared independence from British colonial rule, oil has been produced in Nigeria. Throughout this period, corporate politics has intersected with successive dictatorships. Under these dictatorships the Nigerian government has signed laws that appropriated oil resources and placed these under the control of multinational oil companies, such as Chevron Corporation and Royal Dutch Shell.

From the point of view of MEND, and its supporters, the people of the Niger Delta have suffered an unprecedented degradation of their environment due to unchecked pollution produced by the oil industry. As a result of this policy of dispossessing people from their lands in favor of foreign oil interests, within a single generation, many now have no ability to fish or farm. People living in the Niger Delta have found themselves in a situation where their government and the international oil companies own all the oil under their feet, the revenues of which are rarely seen by the people who are suffering from the consequences of oil extraction.

Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, has said of the situation:

The oil companies can’t pretend they don’t know what’s happening all around them. The Nigerian government obviously has the primary responsibility to stop human rights abuse. But the oil companies are directly benefiting from these crude attempts to suppress dissent, and that means they have a duty to try and stop it.

Eghare W.O. Ojhogar, chief of the Ugborodo community, said: “It is like paradise and hell. They have everything. We have nothing… If we protest, they send soldiers.”

Over the last twenty years various political movements and activists have emerged in opposition to the perceived injustices perpetrated upon the people of the Niger Delta by the government and the oil companies. These were usually nonviolent; Ken Saro-Wiwa was the most famous activist. Saro-Wiwa was an Ogoni poet-turned-activist who was executed by the Nigerian government in 1995 on what many believe to be deliberately false charges with the aim of silencing his vocal opposition to the oil interests in Nigeria. In Saro-Wiwa’s footsteps came others who, having seen the government’s reaction to nonviolent activism, advocated violence as resistance to what they regarded as the enslavement of their people. Militants in the delta enjoy widespread support among the region’s approximately 20 million people, most of whom live in poverty despite the enormous wealth generated in the oil-rich region.[8]

With this background, a series of meetings In November 2005 between representatives from the Federation of Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), along with fighters from Cult groups such as Klansmen Konfraternity (KK) and Greenlanders led to the emergence of a new group called MEND. An agreement was also made to start using militant force to attack oil installations.[9]

Following a string of Boko Haram bombings in Nigeria in the 2010s, and many attacks against Christian targets, MEND threatened to bomb mosques and assassinate Muslim clerics. MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo said a campaign will start on 31 May “to save Christianity in Nigeria from annihilation. The bombings of mosques, haj camps, Islamic institutions, large congregations in Islamic events and assassinations of clerics that propagate doctrines of hate will form the core mission of this crusade.” However, Operation Barbarossa would be called off if Christian organisations and the Henry Okah intervene; it further called on Boko Haram to stop attacking Christians and churches.[10] It then announced a suspension of the plans after calls from religious groups and prominent citizens such as Henry Okah.[11]

Constituency and organization

MEND is closely connected with Asari’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, a rebel group with similar aims. MEND reportedly seeks “a union of all relevant militant groups in the Niger Delta.”[12] However, the identity of MEND is somewhat obscure since its leaders like to remain faceless[13] and its cause has been taken up by completely unrelated groups inspired by the original MEND, one of which is claiming responsibility for some of the violence that has occurred. However, the original members of MEND (recognized as MEND by the United States government and Chevron security), have claimed that impostors are causing some of the violence that is now occurring.[14]

MEND’s evolving approach to conducting warfare has been described as “open source”,[7] so called because it is analogous to the decentralized communal development process now prevalent in the software industry, making it extremely quick to innovate and move new technologies and tactics rapidly from cell to cell without the direction of a vulnerable leadership hierarchy.[15] Former United States Air Force “counter-terrorism” officer, technology analyst, and software entrepreneur, John Robb, in a Wired Magazine interview about the emergence of “open source guerrillas”, alleged that MEND “doesn’t even field its own guerillas. They hire their experts and fighters mostly from criminal gangs and tribal warrior cults to do their operations.” [16]

Timeline of activities

See also: Foreign hostages in Nigeria

This article is in list format, but may read better as prose. You can help by converting this article, if appropriate. Editing help is available. (September 2009)

2006

Nine officials for the Italian petrol company Eni SpA were killed when armed members of MEND attacked Eni SpA’s security forces in Port Harcourt. MEND militants briefly occupied and robbed a bank near the Eni SpA base, leaving at about 3:30 p.m, about an hour after they showed up.

A company official stated, “Eni has temporarily evacuated staff and contractors from the area of the base affected by the incident and the situation is currently under control.”

MEND issued a statement regarding the oil workers: “Be assured therefore that the hostages in return, will remain our guests… the hostages are in good health and have adapted fairly well to the conditions under which the people of the Niger Delta have been kept.”

On May 10, 2006, an executive with the United States-based oil company Baker Hughes was shot and killed in the south-eastern city of Port Harcourt. At the time of the shooting, it was not immediately known if MEND had any involvement or not. Witnesses say the attacker appeared to be specifically targeting the US executive.

On June 2, 2006, a Norwegian rig offshore Nigeria was attacked and 16 crew members were kidnapped. According to the news agency Reuters, MEND has not taken responsibility for this attack.[17]

On August 20, 2006, 10 MEND members were killed by the Nigerian military. The members were working on releasing a Royal Dutch Shell hostage. In an email to REUTERS, MEND stated, “Our response to Sunday’s killings will come at our time, but for certain it will not go unpunished.”

On October 2, 2006, 10 Nigerian soldiers were killed off the shore of the Niger Delta in their patrol boat by a MEND mortar shell. Earlier that day a Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell convoy was attacked in the Port Harcourt region resulting in some people being wounded.

On October 3, 2006, a militant group abducted four Scots, a Malaysian, an Indonesian and a Romanian from a bar in Akwa Ibom state.

On October 4, 2006, Nigerian soldiers attacked a militant camp, in the ensuing battle nine Nigerian soldiers were killed.

On November 22, 2006, Nigerian soldiers attempted a rescue of kidnapped oil workers which resulted in one soldier being killed.

2007

On May 1, 2007, at 4:15 a.m., MEND attacked Chevron’s Oloibiri floating production, storage, and offloading vessel off the coast of the southern Bayelsa state. After one hour of fighting with security boats, resulting in the death of 10 people, MEND seized six expatriate workers, consisting of four Italians (Mario Celentano, Raffaele Pasceriello, Ignazio Gugliotta, Alfonso Franza), an American (John Stapelton), and a Croat (Jurica Ruic). On the same day, MEND published photos of the captives seated on white plastic chairs in a wooden shelter around the remains of a campfire.[18]

On May 3, 2007, MEND seized eight foreign hostages from another offshore vessel. The hostages were released less than 24 hours later, stating they had intended to destroy the vessel and did not want more hostages.

23 May 7 hostages were taken from a pipelay barge of Nimbe area of Bayelsa they were released 23 days later. they included Brittins Americans and one South African.

On May 8, 2007, three major oil pipelines (one in Brass and two in the Akasa area) were attacked, shutting down oil production and cutting power to a facility run by Italian oil company Agip, part of the ENI energy group. An e-mail statement from a MEND spokesperson said, “Fighters of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attacked and destroyed three major pipelines in Bayelsa state… We will continue indefinitely with attacks on all pipelines, platforms and support vessels.”

On September 23, 2007, a MEND spokesperson named Jomo Gbomo announced, through a communiqué to the Philadelphia Independent Media Center, that media reports of his arrest and detention were false; and then further informed, through the letter, that MEND had officially declared war, effective 12 midnight, September 23, 2007, and that they would be commencing “attacks on installations and abduction of expatriates.”

On November 13, 2007, MEND militants attacked Cameroonian soldiers on the disputed Bakassi peninsula, killing more than 20 soldiers; three days after this incident, a southern Cameroonian rebel group claimed responsibility for the attack.[19]

2008

On May 3, 2008, MEND militants attacked Shell-operated pipelines in Nigeria, forcing the company to halt 170,000 barrels per day (27,000 m3/d) of exports of Bonny Light crude.[20]

On June 20, 2008, MEND naval forces attacked the Shell-operated Bonga oil platform, shutting down 10% of Nigeria’s oil production in one fell swoop. The oil platform, Shell’s flagship project in the area capable of extracting a massive 200,000 barrels (32,000 m3) of oil a day, was widely assumed to be outside the reach of the militants due to its location 120 km off-shore. This attack has demonstrated a level of prowess and sophistication never before seen by the rebels and it is now known that all of Nigeria’s oil platforms are within range of MEND attack.[21]

On September 14, 2008, MEND inaugurated the Operation Hurricane Barbarossa with an ongoing string of militant attacks to bring down the oil industry in Rivers State.[22]

In September 2008, MEND released a statement proclaiming that their militants had launched an “oil war” throughout the Niger Delta against both pipelines and oil production facilities, and the Nigerian soldiers that protect them. In the statement MEND claimed to have killed 22 Nigerian soldiers in one attack against a Chevron-owned oil platform. The Nigerian government confirmed that their troops were attacked in numerous locations, but said that all assaults were repelled with the infliction of heavy casualties on the militants. On September 27, a week after declaring an oil war and destroying several significant oil production and transportation hubs in the delta,[23] the group declared a ceasefire until “further notice” upon the intervention of Ijaw and other elders in the region.[24]

2009

MEND called off its ceasefire on January 30, 2009.[25]

Equatorial Guinea blamed MEND for an attack on the presidential palace in Malabo on February 17, which resulted in the death of at least one attacker. MEND denied involvement.[26][27]

On May 15, 2009, a military operation undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF) began against MEND.[28] It came in response to the kidnapping of Nigerian soldiers and foreign sailors in the Delta region.[29] Thousands of Nigerians have fled their villages and hundreds of people may be dead because of the offensive.[30]

MEND has claimed responsibility for pipeline attacks on June 18–21 on three oil installations belonging to Royal Dutch Shell in the Niger Delta. In a campaign labeled by the group as “Hurricane Piper Alpha”, Chevron was also warned that it would “pay a price” for allowing the Nigerian military use of an oil company airstrip.[31]

On June 18, MEND claimed they had blown up a Shell pipeline, as a warning to Russian president Dmitry Medvedev who was arriving to Nigeria the next day and to any potential foreign investors [32]

On June 26, MEND attacked the Shell Billie/Krakama pipeline as a warning to foreign investors timed with the visit to Nigeria of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.[33] On the 29th, MEND attacked two well clusters in an oil facility belonging to Royal Dutch Shell, at its Estuary Field.[34]

July 6, MEND claimed responsibility for an attack on the Okan oil manifold. The pipeline was blown up at 8:45 p.m. (3:45 p.m. ET) Sunday. The militants claim that the manifold carried some 80 percent of Chevron Nigeria Limited’s off-shore crude oil to a loading platform.

In a separate action on the same day, the group said that three Russians, two Filipinos and an Indian were seized Sunday from the Siehem Peace oil tanker about 30 kilometres (20 mi) from the southern port city of Escravos.[35]

MEND carried out its first attack in Lagos late July 11. Rebels attacked and set on fire the Atlas Cove Jetty on Tarkwa Bay, which is a major oil hub for Nigeria. Five workers were killed in the strike.[36]

As at 17th of Oct, reliable sources stated that The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) would resume its hostilities against the Nigerian oil industry, the Nigerian Armed Forces and its collaborators with effect from (no time specified) hours, Friday, October 16, 2009,” the group’s spokesman, Jomo Gbomo, said in the statement.[37]

Oct 25 MEND announces unilateral truce and accepts the government’s proposal for reintegration.[38]

Nov 24 MEND gunmen hijacked the oil carrier Cancale Star. 2 sailors were killed while another was wounded. When the gunmen fled the ship one gunman was overpowered by the ship’s crew.

2010

Jan 30: MEND called off its unilateral truce and threatened an “all-out onslaught” against the oil industry.[39]

March 15: Two bombs exploded at a Government House of Nigeria during the Post Amnesty Dialogue in Warri. The bombs killed three people and injured six more. The explosion damaged the Government House and other buildings in the area. MEND claimed responsibility for this attack.[40]

August 27: High ranking MEND commander Soboma George is killed by some of his own soldiers. His killers say they killed him because he ordered a hit on Rivers State governor Rotimi Amaechi.

Main article: October 2010 Abuja attacks

October 1: Two bombs exploded at Abuja during a parade. 12 killed 17 injured. Bomb was 1 km away from president Goodluck Jonathan. MEND claimed responsibility and also claim to have sent warning in the form of an email to a journalist half-an-hour before the bombs detonated.

October 2: MEND leader Henry Okah is arrested in Johannesburg, South Africa.

November 8: Gunmen raid an oil rig off Nigeria, kidnapping Two Americans, two Frenchmen, two Indonesians, and a Canadian. MEND claimed responsibility.[41]

November 15: MEND attack on an Exxon Mobil oil platform, kidnapping seven Nigerian workers.[42]

November 21: The rebels say they have sabotaged an oil pipeline feeding the refinery in Warri in the Niger Delta.[43]

2011

March 16: A bomb exploded on an oil platform Agip in southern Nigeria. This is for the first MEND attack on a major bombing campaign.[44]

May 19: MEND leader John Togo was killed during an airstrike by the Nigerian Air Force.

September 14: 14 Filipino and 9 Spanish sailors were kidnapped off the oil tanker MT Mattheos I by MEND gunmen. All 23 men were later released on September 26.

October 13: 20 Russian sailors were kidnapped off the oil vessel MT Cape Bird. All 20 sailors were later released.

October 19: MEND gunmen hijacked the ExxonMobil tanker AHST Wilbert Tide near Opobo. The gunmen kidnapped the captain before stealing large amounts of oil. The captain was released soon after.

November 1: 3 British sailors were kidnapped off an oil vessel operated by Chevron. All 3 were released a month later in December.

2012

January 12: MEND militants bomb a hotel in Warri. No people were reported injured.

February 2: MEND gunmen attempted to hijack an oil carrier but are repelled by gunfire from the vessel.

February 4: MEND militants sabotage an oil pipeline belonging to Agip in Bayelsa State.

February 13: MEND gunmen shot dead the captain and chief engineer of a cargo ship 180 km (110 mi) off the coast of Nigeria.

February 29: 3 Dutch sailors were kidnapped off the coast of Rivers State after 8 MEND gunmen stormed the ship.

July 27: MEND gunmen attacked an oil carrier operated by Agip off the coast of Bayelsa State leaving 1 sailor dead.

August 4: 1 Iranian, 1 Malaysian, and 1 Thai sailors were kidnapped off an oil carrier 56 km (35 mi) off the Nigerian coast. During a gun battle with the Nigerian Navy 2 Nigerian soldiers were killed by the militants.

September 5: MEND gunmen hijacked the oil tanker Abu Dhabi Star 23 km (14 mi) off the coast of Nigeria. The gunmen managed to steal a large amount of oil and narrowly escaped capture by the Nigerian Navy.

October 6: An oil tanker off the coast of the Ivory Coast was hijacked by pirates affiliated to MEND. The pirates held the 25-man crew for 3 days before they stole 400 m3 (2,500 bbl) of oil from the ship.

October 15: MEND gunmen kidnapped 7 sailors aboard the Bourbon Liberty 249. All 7 were released on November 1 for an unknown amount of ransom.

December 13: MEND gunmen attacked the oil carrier PM Salem, killing 1 and injuring 2.

December 17: 5 Indian sailors aboard the SP Brussels were kidnapped by MEND militants. The entire ship was looted and set ablaze about 64 km (40 mi) from shore. All 5 men were later released on January 27, 2013 for ransom.

December 20: 4 South Korean oil workers were kidnapped by MEND gunmen from an oil plant in the Niger Delta. All 4 men were released on December 23.

December 23: 3 Italian sailors aboard the Asso Ventuno were kidnapped during a raid on the ship. All 3 men were released on January 9, 2013.

December 30: MEND gunmen attacked an oil barge operated by Agip in Rivers State. No oil workers were killed or kidnapped.

2013

January 9: MEND militants and the Nigerian soldiers got into a gun battle in Ogun State after they were seen stealing oil out of a pipeline. The gun battle resulted in the explosion of the pipeline killing 7 militants and 3 Nigerian soldiers as well as 40 people in a nearby village.

February 4: MEND militants hijacked a Filipino operated oil vessel near Bonny Island. 1 sailor was killed and another was kidnapped.

February 5: MEND militants were responsible for attacking and destroying an oil barge operated by an Indian company. During the ensuing battle 4 Indian oil workers were killed.

February 7: 2 Russians and 1 Romanian sailors were kidnapped from a British cargo ship. The gunmen looted and heavily damaged the ship. The 3 men were later released on March 13.

February 7: MEND militants attacked and briefly hijacked the Armada Tugas oil carrier. No sailors were kidnapped or injured.

February 10: MEND militants attacked the Walvis 7 oil carrier. No sailors were kidnapped or injured.

February 17: 6 Russian sailors were kidnapped aboard the Armada Tuah 101 cargo ship. All 6 men were released on February 26 for 200 million Naira ($1.3 million) ransom.

February 22: 2 Pakistani sailors were kidnapped off of an oil carrier. 1 of the sailors was released on March 7 while the other has yet to be released.

March 1: The Nigerian Navy captured 33 pirates affiliated to MEND off the coast of Lagos.

March 2: MEND gunmen attacked the fishing vessel Orange 7 80 km (50 mi) off shore. No sailors were taken captive.

March 4: MEND militants were responsible for sabotaging an oil pipeline operated by Royal Dutch Shell.

March 5: MEND gunmen hijacked an oil carrier. The gunmen looted and heavily damaged the ship while stealing large amounts of oil and money.

March 7: 3 Malaysian sailors were kidnapped aboard the Armada Tuah 22. The 3 men were freed on March 22 after the Joint Task Force raided a MEND camp while also capturing 4 militants.

March 20: MEND militants sabotaged an oil pipeline operated by Chevron in Delta State near Warri.

March 26: MEND leader Henry Okah is sentenced to 24 years in prison by a South African court for the October 2010 Abuja attacks. MEND threatens violence and has said “The gates of hell have just been let loose.”

March 31: The Joint Task Force captured 12 MEND gunmen while stealing oil out of a pipeline.

April 4: MEND spokesmen Jomo Gbomo sent an email to president Goodluck Jonathan stating that starting on April 5 MEND would resume hostilities on Nigerian oil installations.

April 5: MEND militants who had accepted amnesty 4 years earlier stormed the Nigerian National Assembly demanding more than what the government had given them. The ex-militants threatened to return to fighting if their demands were not met.

April 6: 12 Nigerian Police officers were killed by MEND gunmen in Bayelsa State. The police were shot at while escorting an ex-militant who had stolen money from MEND a year earlier.

April 11: 3 MEND militants were arrested in Bayelsa State for the murder of 12 police officers 5 days earlier.

April 13: MEND militants bomb and destroy Oil Well 62 operated by Royal Dutch Shell in Bayelsa State.

April 16: MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo sent an e-mail to Bloomberg News threatening to “bomb mosques, hajj camps, and other Islamic institutions.” Gbomo calls this “Operation Save Christianity” and says this is in response to the bombings of churches in northern Nigeria.

April 22: 21 MEND militants were captured by the Joint Task Force in a boat containing 400 m3 (2,500 bbl) of stolen oil.

April 22: 2 Russian and 2 Ukrainian sailors were kidnapped by MEND gunmen 160 km (100 mi) off the coast of Bayelsa State. All 4 men were released on May 26 after the camp they were held in was seized by the Joint Task Force.

April 23: Nigerian soldiers invade Bayelsa communities in search of MEND militants. This has thrown the Niger Delta into a state confusion and panic due to the past massacres in Odi and Zaki Biam.

April 27: The Joint Task Force raided 7 MEND camps in Bayelsa State but were unable to capture any militants. The JTF later destroyed the camps by setting them on fire.

April 28: 76 MEND militants were captured by the Joint Task Force while stealing oil out of a pipeline near the city of Yenagoa.

April 28: 9 oil workers were kidnapped by MEND gunmen off an oil installation operated by Royal Dutch Shell. The kidnappers are thought to be responsible for the murder of 12 police officers 3 weeks earlier.

April 29: 3 Sri Lankan, 1 Russian, and 1 Burmese sailors were kidnapped by MEND gunmen off the coast of Brass. Reports say 14 MEND gunmen raided the cargo ship stealing money, electronics, and a watch-dog. All of the men were released on May 14 after a ransom was paid.

May 5: 8 ex-militants were killed by MEND gunmen in Yenagoa after they were found out to be collaborating with the Joint Task Force. A gunfight erupted when the MEND gunmen were spotted by Nigerian Police.

May 12: MEND gunmen kidnapped the daughter of Nigerian supreme court judge Bode Rhodes-Vivour. A ransom was paid 2 hours after her abduction and the militants released her soon after.

May 14: MEND gunmen attacked 10 passenger boats on the Niger River while on their way to a funeral. All of the passengers were robbed of their belongings and one man was doused in petrol and almost set on fire when he refused to hand over his cell phone.

May 28: 12 Pakistani and 5 Nigerian sailors were kidnapped off the oil tanker MT Matrix 64 km (40 mi) off the coast of Bayelsa State. The entire crew was released on June 6 without a ransom being paid.

June 13: Pirates affiliated to MEND hijacked the French oil tanker Adour 48 km (30 mi) off the coast of Togo. The pirates took one sailor hostage before fleeing from the Nigerian Navy. The sailor was eventually freed on June 18 when the Joint Task Force seized the pirates camp.

June 15: MEND militants succeeded in blowing up 2 gasoline tankers in Abaji, 124 km (77 mi) south of Abuja. MEND spokesman Jomo Gbomo warned drivers of gasoline tankers to “keep a safe distance from their trucks”.

June 19: 2 Indian and 2 Polish sailors were kidnapped by pirates affiliated to MEND after the oil vessel MDPL Continental One was attacked 48 km (30 mi) off the Nigerian coast.

July 14: Militants detonate and destroy a crude oil pipeline in Rivers State. The perpetrators are thought to affiliated to MEND.

July 16: Pirates hijacked the Turkish oil carrier MT Cotton 24 km (15 mi) off the coast of Port-Gentil, Gabon. The pirates took the 24-man crew hostage before fleeing back to Nigeria with their captives and large amounts of crude oil.

August 15: Pirates hijacked the Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged oil vessel MT Notre. The pirates were able to keep the entire crew hostage for 4 days until a Nigerian Navy vessel intercepted the ship and killed 12 pirates while 4 surrendered peacefully.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 Methodology and procedure

In this research the researcher among other methods used the descriptive research method. The descriptive research is concerned with the collection, presentation, analysis and interpretation of data for the purpose of describing vividly existing conditions, prevailing practices and beliefs, attitudes, on-going procures etc. the descriptive research goes beyond the description of the conditions or phenomena to include discovery of meaning. It also focuses a discovery of trends that are developing. The main objectives of descriptive research is to get detailed and factual information about issues, events, problems and describe the events as they are.

The descriptive research method enabled the researcher to describe in a systematic manner national security role of the movement for the emancipation of niger delta (mend)

. The essentials of the descriptive research cannot be over-looked, it is a research that gives the true picture of the whole situation or problem. It gives the basis for eliciting possible policies for alleviating problems. It also saves time. The data for the descriptive analysis was generated through various types of data collection; they are interviews, which are structured interview and unstructured interview, also through an empirical investigation. They all will be discussed below.

INTERVIEWS:

Interviews involve eliciting information from the respondent through some verbal interaction between the interview and the respondent. It is a face to face interaction situation in which one person the interviewer questions, which are responded to orally. The questions which are properly framed, allows the respondent easy understanding of the information that are being sort for.

3.2 The empirical investigation

The researcher conducted a detailed empirical investigation in selected Niger delta states. The method here was based on sustained participant observation approach (Scott, 1965). Data were collected through interviews, study of secondary material and observation. The observation is an investigation method used to obtain direct information method used to obtain direct information on the behavior of individuals, objects or situations. It involves watching people, situations phenomena and getting first-hand information relating to particular aspects of such people, events, situations or phenomena.

Information relating to certain aspects of human behavior can only be obtained in the particular settings where such behaviors are exhibited. Use of interviews are discussed above. Secondary materials are those source of information which other people did not participate or witness the events. The author of a secondary source material tries to collect and synthesize a pool of materials, which include encyclopedia, dictionaries, textbooks, journals and periodicals, newspapers and magazines as well as publications. Extensive use was made of personnel interviews. In this research the researcher concentrated on focused interviews. This involved the use of guided questionnaire sheet which are designed to assist the researcher to obtain desired information from the respondents. This technique was aimed at giving the respondents the freedom to answer questions asked, while the interviewer occasionally directed the discussion towards the course that will enable him obtain the required information.

3.3 Reliability of data collected

interviews used where the structured interviews and unstructured interview. The structured interview is a rigidly standardized and formal kind of interview. The questions were presented to the different respondents, in the same order and choice of alternative responses, and it is restricted to predetermined list. The structured approach allowed for reliable data analysis. In the unstructured interview, which is a flexible type of interview which contains very few restrictions on the respondent’s answers, the respondents were encouraged to express their thoughts freely.

The secondary materials that were studies were those relating to internal topic. These include textbooks, publications of government, newspapers, journals and periodicals. The textbooks were gotten from the library to provide detailed information and knowledge. Generally, the textbooks provided interpretation in the topic. The government publications like books, pamphlets, e.t.c. from different government agencies and parastatals contain very rich information concerning the topic, they included statistical reports, research reports, official reports, laws and other materials that are not readily available elsewhere.

The newspapers on the other hand provided current information concerning peoples’ views and opinions in the area of study. The formed valuable sources of information from where good ideas have been obtained to be helpful in designing and executing a very good work

3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

In this study, the research method had great emphasis toward the descriptive sample survey. This approach was adopted here because the researcher worked with a much number of potential variable of interest with little previous knowledge of theory that would inform us on where to begin. It is considered that a more flexible and exploratory approach will be needed.

A possible compromise between the exploratory research of the single participant observer and a much more systematic and standardized approach is the descriptive sample survey. In this sample survey, a premium is placed on certain kinds of standardization, here the research was concerned with the methodology areas.

This final to collect data in such a way that all respondents are confronted with rarely identical questions.This seems is concerned with sampling are the question of generalization in making results. The third is with specifying standard criterion for data analysis procedure so that different analysis may reach similar conclusion based on the available data.

3.5 Population of the study

The available population of the affected states is two hundred and fourteen (200), the information was obtained from the records of various sources.

3.6 Instrument for data collection

Two instruments where used in the study and it yields a lot of contribution and contents.

i. Oral Interview: The research used face-to-face interview with the interviews with the respondents to obtain the necessary information needed from the organization.

ii. Questionnaire: The research used questionnaires to gather information from the respondents. The questionnaire contains difference questions. Some option from which the respondents were, required to choose

3.7 Validation of the instrument

The instrument was subjected to both content and face validity by supervision, after all the corrections, the validated instrument was taken back for conformation to ensure that suggestions and observation were incorporated.

3.8 Reliability of the instrument

The instrument was subjected to test, retest reliability test. The result showed a good internal consistency.

3.9 Methods of data collection

The data for this study where obtained from primary data where obtained from respondents, through direct interview and questionnaire method.

The secondary data were obtained through the stocks of material from the researchers’ friends and associates and National library. More so, an experience from observation was very helpful in this research work.

3.10 Methods of data analysis

The analysis of data was organized along the following lines. Descriptive statistical analysis was used to indicate percentage scores of all the respondents. The calculation of respondents were equally drawn up on the table.

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